The liquidity premium on U.S. government securities is quantitatively estimated and tabulated, using maturities from 1 month to 30 years. Unbiased forecasting by the market is assumed in order to get at expectations. The premium is estimated, first allowing it to take any shape and then constraining it to conform to a functional form which implies that the "normal" shape of the yield curve is monotonically increasing toward an asymptote. Tests for constancy of the premium over the postAccord period, normality of the forecasting errors, and monotonicity of the premium with respect to maturity are performed, and the dependence of the premium on the level of interest rates is discussed.
this procedure, and to attack the other questions posed above. The results are compared with those obtained by other investigators.
II. The Behavior of the Postwar Liquidity Premium
In this section, we define an estimator of the liquidity premium. Its values for three pilot maturities are used to test the premium and the variance of the forecasting errors for constancy over the postwar period. The forecasting errors are tested for normality, and the dependence of the liquidity premium on the level of interest rates is discussed.
An Estimator of the Liquidity Premium
In the real world, observed bond maturities do not lie at evenly spaced discrete intervals, even though this would make our calculations easier. Nevertheless, we would expect the price of any security to be governed by a smooth discount function .5(t, s), which gives the value at time t of a dollar to be repaid at time s in the future, that is, after maturity m = s -t.
Corresponding to the discount function we observe at time t is a twodimensional complex of forward interest rates r(t, SI, S2) on hypothetical point-payment forward loans to begin at time sl and be repaid at time S2, where t < SI < S2* Most past investigators have taken m2 (where m2 = S2 -sI the duration of the forward loan) as a constant with some convenient value, usually a week, month, quarter, or year, and have considered the liquidity premium corresponding only to a one-dimensional complex of forward rates as ml varies (where ml = s1 -t, the period until the forward loan begins). We, on the other hand, are interested in all values of m2, from the limit as m2 approaches zero out to several years or even decades. In the next section, we will treat both forward rates and the liquidity premium in terms of the two variables ml and M2.
However, the forward rates for different values of m2 are far from independent. In general, forward rates with large m2 can be obtained by averaging together appropriate forward rates with smaller M2. It is therefore convenient for our investigation of the qualitative properties of the liquidity premium to single out a one-dimensional complex of independent forward rates, taking m2 equal to its smallest value of interest. In our case, this is the limit as m2 goes to zero. This "marginal" or "instantaneous" forward rate p(t, s), where s = t + ml, is related to the discount function by p(t, s) = 100 a(t, s) /as (1) 3(t, s) Because we fit a smooth curve to the discount function, we are able to evaluate this derivative. When t and s coincide, p(t, t) becomes a "spot" rate of interest on a hypothetical loan of very short maturity, in effect a ''call money" rate.
We define the liquidity premium ir(m) to be the difference between the forward rate and the expected value of the future spot rate: p(t, s) = Etp(s, s) + 7c(m), m = s -t,
where Et denotes the expected value as of time t.4 Of course, not all participants have the same expectations about the future. We must regard Etp(t, s) as some sort of market average of individual expectations. ' If forecasting errors are unbiased, we could compare the forward rate with the actual subsequent spot rate to get an estimator of i(m). However, for large values of m, we would have very few such pairs of observations. We can get around this problem by observing that today's forecast of some distant future variable must be an unbiased estimator of all future forecasts of that variable. Thus, if we have observations on the term structure at points in time At apart, we must have:
Etp(s, s) = Et[Et+Atp(s, s)],
where s is some time later than t + At. This seems like a reasonable assertion; if we had any reason at time t to believe that our next period expectation of p(s, s) would be any different from our current expectation, we would already have incorporated this information into our current expectation, bringing the two expectations into equality.6 Given observations on the term structure at times t1, t2, . 6 This is essentially the point Samuelson makes (1965, pp. 41-49). His analysis is unnecessarily complicated by assumptions about the relation between anticipations and current forward prices. The real crux of his argument is that anticipations themselves must fluctuate randomly. The proof of our assertion is similar to the proofs he gives. Once we have identified the psychological anticipation with the mathematical expected value by our unbiased forecasting assumption, the remainder of the proof is a purely mathematical consequence of the properties of probability distributions.
where ui j is a random forecasting error with mean zero. When we sum (5) over i from one to n, we obtain the following estimator of 7r ( Since the ui , have mean zero, the vmj also have mean zero.7 The discount function 3 (t, s) was fit for the close of each month from December 1946 to March 1966 by means of a quadratic spline.8 The prices used were the means of bid-and-asked monthly closing offers for most fully taxable U.S. government bills, notes, and bonds.9 Forward rates were derived from these discount curves, and from them the values nrj(m) were calculated. 
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Homogeneity
For the purpose of analysis, we divided this interval into four approximately equal periods, as shown in table 1. These periods correspond roughly to the pre-Accord period, the first Eisenhower administration, Although we would expect the pure forecasting errors to be serially uncorrelated, the errors we observe may not be because of additional errors introduced in measuring nrj (m). The term structure cannot be measured exactly, and measurement errors for forward rates of different maturities are strongly correlated. Adjacent estimators irj_ (m) and nrj(m) are both dependent on the term structure for time tj, so their measurement errors will not be independent. However, the measurement errors for alternate estimators are completely independent, so that if we discard alternate observations, we should satisfy the serial independence assumption necessary to estimate the mean. Using all the data would give us smaller, but erroneous, confidence intervals. In order to avoid the month of the Accord, we will use the even-numbered observations, that is, starting with the month January 31, 1947 to February 29, 1947.10
The premium seems to be small with a small variance during period 1, definitely positive with an intermediate variance during periods 2 and 4, and perhaps larger with the largest variance during period 3. This suggests the following hypotheses: H1-a common mean and variance for all four periods (one mean, one variance); H2-one mean and variance for period 1, and a second mean and variance for periods 2-4 (two means, two variances); H3-one mean for all four periods, but separate variances for each period (one mean, four variances); H4-one mean for period 1, a second mean for periods 2-4, and separate variances for each period (two means, four variances); H5-a different mean and variance for each period (four means, four variances).
These hypotheses were compared to one another using the likelihood ratio test. The asymptotically x2 statistics are shown in however, reject H4 in favor of H5. We interpret these results as meaning that there has been a fairly constant liquidity premium since the Accord, although the variance of forecasting errors has not been constant. We may not treat the pre-Accord liquidity premium as equal to the postAccord premium, but this is to be expected, since prior to the Accord the Federal Reserve System explicitly supported the prices of government securities, so that forward rates did not necessarily reflect market forces. The difference between the pre-and post-Accord means for 1 year and 15 years is not significant due to the greater accumulation of forecasting errors for these maturities, but we assume that the same is true for these maturities as for 3 months. I I Table 3 shows the maximum-likelihood estimates of the means and standard deviations for the different periods under H4. The pre-Accord premium, at least for 3 months, was significantly lower than the postAccord premium. Standard deviations increase with maturity and are higher for period 3 and lower for period 1 than they are for periods 2 or 4. For comparison, the post-Accord means for the omitted odd observations are shown. They run a little higher than the means for the even observations, but not significantly so. Also shown are von Neumann ratios based on the H4 residuals divided by their estimated standard deviations. As predicted above, autocorrelation is highly significant when we use all the observations (at least for 3 months and 1 year), but becomes insignificant when we use only alternative observations. II Wallace (1964, pp. 25-26) also finds significantly different behavior prior to the accord than after. Tests for Normality Table 4 shows the "standardized range" statistic for our post-Accord observations nj(m). It is defined as the ratio of the sample range to the estimate of the standard deviation of the errors. When the standard deviation is treated as if it were constant, we find that we may easily reject normality at the 99 percent level for 3 months and 1 year, and at the 98 percent level for 15 years. This finding might lead us to reject, as Roll does (1970, chap. 4), normality in favor of the class of symmetric stable distributions. If so, we would arrive at the estimates for the characteristic exponent a of the stable distributions shown in the second line of table 4.12 Our estimates of a are on the same order as those obtained by Roll.13 However, when we allow for different variances in periods 2, 3, and 4, and divide the maximum-likelihood residuals by their respective estimated standard deviations before calculating the standardized range, we find that the resulting statistics are never significant at the 90 percent level, and only once at the 80 percent level. Although we can reject homoskedastic normality, we are unable to reject heteroskedastic normality. Provided we allow for this heteroskedasticity, we seem to be justified in using tests based on the more familiar normal distribution.'4 12 See Fama and Roll (1968; Any direct comparison between our liquidity premium estimator and the level of rates is open to two objections. First, in deriving it, we assumed the underlying premium was constant. This can bias any comparison to the extent that the unforeseen change in rates has been correlated with the level of rates. Second, the premium estimator and the level are both calculated with measurement error from the same data. This can lend some inconsistency to any regression coefficients.
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Although it should be interpreted with caution, the comparison is still worth making. In view of the inconclusive nature of our own findings and the lack of consensus in the literature, we will assume that the post-Accord liquidity premium has been approximately independent of the level of interest rates.
III. The Post-Accord Liquidity Premium
Using the information we gathered in Section II about the behavior of the liquidity premium and the forecasting errors, we are ready to estimate the liquidity premium for a variety of maturities. We first estimate it without imposing any particular functional form on it. We find no evidence to contradict monotonicity or boundedness, so we then estimate it under the assumption that the premium monotonically approaches an asymptote. Since we are interested primarily in how free-market forces (relatively speaking) shape the term structure, and since the pre-Accord liquidity premium has been shown to be significantly different from that since the Accord, we restrict ourselves in this section to our 90 alternate post-Accord observations. The Mean Liquidity Premium
One of the most important applications of the liquidity premium is to evaluate the market's expectation of future interest rates spanning a positive interval in the future, on the basis of current forward rates. We define the mean forward rate observed at time t corresponding to a loan to begin at time t + m1 and to be repaid at time t + ml + m2 by 
Transactions Costs
If there were no transactions costs, it would follow from table 6 that for many pairs of maturities, it is worth the while of a lender who desires a short holding period to buy a longer maturity and to sell it before maturity, rather than simply to buy the shorter maturity in the first place. However, he cannot really both buy and sell at the bid-asked mean prices as implicitly assumed so far. We cannot quantify all the components of the cost to an investor or borrower of going in and out of securities. However, the quoted bid-asked spread gives us a fair estimate of the external component of this cost, at least for large institutional investors. Subject, then, to the condition that he must buy high at the asked price and sell low at the bid price, we may investigate whether the short-term lender does better or worse to buy a longer maturity initially and sell it before maturity than simply to buy a short security.
We found that a lender who wished to lend for only 1, 2, or 3 months would have done significantly better to have bought a 2-, 4-, or 6-month security, respectively, even though it would mean having to go into the market twice instead of only once (McCulloch 1973, pp. 46-50). When we compared these differentials with the comparable values from table 6, we found that the bid-asked spread eats up only about one-third of the liquidity premium for these three pairs of maturities. However, the essentially short-term nature of the liquidity premium is evidenced by the fact that a lender who wished to lend for 4 months would not have done significantly better to have bought an 8-month security.
Miller and Orr (1967, pp. 133-51) have estimated the cost to one large nonfinancial corporation of going into and out of a given security as about $20-$50. Half this internal transaction cost just equals the premium (after bid-asked spread cost) on a 6-month bill held for 3 months, for investments of $36,000-$91,000.
Therefore, a transaction would have to be in the hundreds to thousands of dollars before it definitely pays to try to exploit the liquidity premium.
Exponential Form Estimates of the Liquidity Premium
In tables 5 and 6 we made no assumptions about the form of the liquidity premium as a function of m. Since we put relatively little in, we got relatively little out in return. Thus, for longer maturities, where the variance of the forecasting errors is high, our estimators have very high standard errors. To return to the example we cited in Section I, the forward rate for a 10-year loan 5 years in the future from June 30, 1953 was 3.16 percent per annum. From table 6 ,we see that the premium on this rate would be -0.66 (+0.64) percent per annum, so that a 95 percent confidence interval for the market expectation of the future 10-year spot rate extends from 2.54 percent per annum to 5.10 percent per annum (2.0 standard errors in each direction from 3.16 -[-0.66]). The subsequently observed spot rate was 2.94 percent per annum, which lies within this interval, so we may not say for certain whether there was an unanticipated rise or fall, or no unanticipated change at all.
In order to pin the liquidity premium down with greater precision, we must make stronger assumptions. Kessel (1965) has argued that the liquidity premium should be such as to give the "typical" shape of the yield curve a monotonically increasing shape that approaches a horizontal asymptote.' 8 If so, this information would eliminate much of our present uncertainty as to the behavior of 7r(m) for m greater than 1 year or so.
Our free-form estimate of 7r(m) rises in the first few months and then levels off. Although it falls off after 5 years, its final value (-5.24 + 3.81 percent per year) is not significantly lower than its highest value (0.59 + 2.10 percent per year), so its downward slope for long maturities is not necessarily significant.'9 The low values for long maturities may simply reflect the rise in interest rates over the period studied, which was probably largely unanticipated.
Since the observed liquidity premium seems not to differ significantly from the monotonically increasing-to-an-asymptote shape, we will try fitting it under that assumption. A simple two-parameter function that has these properties is Table 6 can be used to answer a number of questions. The first column of figures tells us how much more return we would make, on average, by turning over daily in securities of maturity m than we would by turning over in "call money.'" (These comparisons ignore transactions costs, which of course would make it prohibitively expensive to buy a 30-year bond, hold it for a day, and then replace it by a new bond with a full 30 years to run. Our "call money" rate is the limit as maturity goes to zero of the bid-asked mean rate on Treasury bills.) The second column tells us how much more we would make by holding securities of maturity m to maturity than we would make by turning over in call money. By subtraction we also obtain the difference in yield to maturity we would obtain over a given period by holding securities of different maturities. The third column of figures in table 6 tells us how much more we would make by turning over daily in long maturities (m -* oc) than by turning over daily in maturity m. Note that on this score there is no perceptible difference between 2-year bonds and perpetuities. The last column tells us how much more we get if we hold longs to maturity than if we hold securities of maturity m to maturity. Comparable free-form estimates do not appear in table 5 because without our exponential-form assumption (or something comparable), we have no information about what happens at infinity.
Our exponential-form estimates are never significantly different from our free-form estimates. Indeed, it is only rarely that they differ by more than 1 free-form standard error. However, our assumption of the exponential form greatly reduces the standard errors. The premium on The striking aspect of table 8 is the very low values for the mean liquidity premium when m2 (the duration of the forward loan) is larger than a year or so. Previous investigations have given the impression that the liquidity premium is on the order of 0.5 percent per year. Our results are not inconsistent with these levels, provided m2 is very small, as it has been in other studies. When m2 becomes large, however, the premium in the subsequent spot rate is almost as large as that in the forward rate. The two nearly cancel out, leaving only a small residual. If we make no assumptions about the form of the premium, as in table 6, we get a very large confidence interval that gives us little information, due to the large amount of "noise" at these maturities. But then we impose monotonicity and boundedness, the additional information closes the confidence interval about a value very near zero.
Under our exponential assumption, p(m1, M2) as defined in (19) obeys the following inequality:
This inequality gives us a convenient upper bound for the liquidity premium. The value of b/a is 0.072 percent (standard error = 0.023), so we may state at the 95 percent confidence level that the mean premium is less than 0.101/M2 percent per year, when M2 is measured in years.20 If m2 is a small fraction of a year, the liquidity premium can be substantial. But when m2 is larger than 3 years or so, the premium is less than the precision with which forward rates can be measured.2' We are able to test the exponential-form estimates against the freeform estimates by means of the likelihood ratio test. With the free form we are estimating six independent means. With the exponential form, we are constraining these six values to conform to a two-parameter function, so twice the logarithm of the likelihood ratio should be compared with the x2 distribution.22 Since its value was 4.71, which is not significant at even the 70 percent level, we may not reject the exponential form. Incidentally, this test provides a test for monotonicity. Since we may not reject this specific monotonic form, it follows a fortiori that we may not reject monotonicity in general. 20 For a one-tailed test, the boundary of the 95 percent confidence region is approximately 1.70 standard errors above the mean. 21 The logit form n(m) = bm/(a + m) was tried in addition to the exponential form. Even though it increases monotonically to an asymptote, it does not imply an upper bound such as that given in eq. (20). However, the exponential form gave a slightly higher likelihood and therefore was preferred. 22 The relevant free-form estimates for this test are ones which maximize the joint likelihood, taking into account the intermaturity covariances. These estimates are slightly different from those given in table 5, which take each maturity by itself. The survey premia are never significantly different from our free-form estimates from table 6, thanks to the high errors on the latter. And the survey premia are not significantly different from our exponential-form estimates for loans of 90 days' duration. In large measure this is due to the ambiguity of the forward rates. However, we run into trouble when we try to compare the survey premia on 1 0-year bonds to our table 8 estimates. For the bond 1 year in the future, the survey premium exceeds ours by four basis points or 1 standard error, and for 2 years, by 21 basis points, or 4 standard errors. This discrepancy casts some doubt on the validity of either our exponential form or the survey responses. It may be that the exponential form approaches its asymptote too quickly. In defense of our results, however, it should be noted that the survey results (taken together with the forward rates we have computed) strongly suggest that p(2 years, 10 years) is about four times p(I year, 10 years), contradicting the widely accepted hypothesis that the premium increases with distance into the future at a decreasing rate.24 The comparison of survey estimates of expectations with unbiased forecasting estimates like ours appears to be a fruitful field for future research.
IV. Conclusion
Without imposing any particular form on the liquidity premium, we were able to demonstrate the following: there is a liquidity premium, significantly greater than zero. This premium has been large enough since the Accord to imply that for some maturities, borrowers or lenders who desire one borrowing or lending period would do better in a different maturity, in spite of the extra costs incurred. The premium has been larger since the Accord than it was during the 4 years before the Accord.
23 (1967) . I am grateful to Malkiel for a letter explaining some of the figures given in that paper. 24 The problem cannot be that the questionnaires were not filled out promptly on April 1, but only after a delay of variable length, for the forward rates in question were actually higher on April 30 and May 31 than they had been at the close of March. 
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Finally, the variance of forecasting errors has not been constant over the period since the Accord.
We were unable to demonstrate any variation in the liquidity premium itself since the Accord, either as a function of time or as a function of the level of interest rates. We were also unable to detect nonnormality in the distribution of the forecasting errors (provided we allow for heteroskedasticity), or nonmonotonicity in the behavior of the premium as a function of maturity.
However, if we do not impose a particular form, our estimates of the mean term premium on long-term forward rates are very inaccurate. When we postulate the monotonic and bounded exponential form of (16) we obtain the relatively precise estimates contained in tables 7 and 8. In particular, we may then say that the forward rate corresponding to a future loan of duration m years is greater than the expected future spot rate, but by no more than 0.101/m percent per year.
